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Heidegger on the Notion of Dasein as Habited Body 
 





Heidegger is often attacked for his failure to offer a thematic account of the body in his Being and 
Time (Aho, 2005). The general misunderstanding of Heidegger’s negation of body arises from the 
different meanings associated with the term ‘body’. Body can be understood from two 
perspectives: body in terms of corpse and body in terms of lived-body. Doctors study body as 
corpse or object because that is required in their training and education. Heidegger’s Being in his 
Being and Time ruled out all dichotomy of the body. The aim of this paper is to understand the 
Heideggerian perspective on Dasein as not a negation of bodilyness but a phenomenological 
understanding of Dasein body, and as such to highlight the dimension of lived-body in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time. The paper will re-examine how Heidegger’s philosophy of Dasein 






Everyone has started re-discovering the body – 
modern, pre-modern and post-modern. According to 
Rosser (2001), the body is everywhere. The body 
talked about is the ‘condemned body’, or the 
‘privileged one’, the ‘body as representation’ or as 
‘confrontation’. The body, exclusively as an objective 
material thing with measurable properties, follows 
from the Cartesian-Galilean traditional model of 
looking at things. But where is the body of the ‘life 
world’, the body that eats, that works, that dies, and 
that is afraid (Bynum, 1995)? The body that 
Heidegger is looking at is different from the Cartesian 
model. Heidegger is concerned with the real living 
body – in other words, the body that eats, that works, 
that dies, that is afraid, which lives out there in the 
world – and not with the body (corpse) lying on the 
table of the doctors (Askay, 1999). For Heidegger, 
corporeality merely indicates that the body is 
physically present (korperhaft). It fails to see the 
phenomenological problem of the body, namely that 
we are ‘there’ in a ‘bodily’ manner (Aho, 2005). 
 
According to Heidegger, the body is personalized in a 
lived context or environment. The person is not 
composed of separate body parts, and does not 
constitute a mind-body dualism as in the Cartesian 
model, but is an integrated bodily unit that is situated 
in a specific location and time. As Deutsch (1993) 
writes, “Persons have bodies to the degree to which 
they appropriate the physical conditions of their 
individuality and become integrated (and not merely 
unified) psychological beings” (p. 5). This means 
that, at the pre-reflective level, the person ‘ex-ists’ the 
body, “I am “embodied” in the sense … that I am my 
body” (p. 5). 
 
Lived Body and Corpse Body 
 
We find ourselves in a situation where we are 
theoretically talking about the corpse body, while 
practically looking for the lived body. The theoretical 
quest of Descartes has assured us of the disembodied 
and detached cogito. After Descartes, body became a 
problem for most philosophers, who could make 
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daring ‘thought experiments’ dichotomizing the real 
inner core from its accidental body-layer. However, 
Heideggerian worldly and embodied Dasein shares a 
pre-reflective bond between the body and the world. 
Heidegger used the word ‘body’ with caution, not 
because he wanted to give less priority to the 
embodied Dasein, but rather because he was reluctant 
to use the bifurcated subject/object models that have 
been passed over as the only acceptable model of 
understanding our bodily nature. From that 
perspective, our body is a problem to us. As 
Heidegger (1927/1962) writes, “Dasein’s bodily 
nature hides a whole problematic of its own” (p. 143). 
This can be better illustrated in terms of Heidegger’s 
Dasein, person as a Being-in-the-world and Being-
with-others. Heidegger describes the paradox of 
embodiment without directly discussing embodiment. 
He considered ‘the Body’ to be the most difficult 
problem (see Cerbone, 2000, pp. 209-230). He 
specifically uses the term Dasein (there-being) 
instead of ‘human’ to try to define what constitutes 
the essence of human being, of human existence. 
 
The Bodily Dasein 
 
Dasein is a wider context that accommodates the 
corporal and the lived in a harmonious manner. 
Heideggerian Dasein experiences no dichotomy 
between the biological and the personal, between the 
patient, whose body alone is a problem that needs 
correction, and the agent whose facticity is an 
inseparable and an essential component of his own 
personal meaning. Facticity designates the irreducible 
specificity and the ‘always alreadyness’ of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world. The Heideggerian Dasein dwells 
in his body. For the authentic Dasein, there is a living 
bond between the fourfoldness of its embodied, 
psychological, cosmological and spiritual nature, all 
of which aspects, in their harmonious interplay, bring 
out the multifaceted personality of the earthly Dasein 
who is both ontic and ontological, both a body with 
its cells and liver and kidneys, and one who is not 
only his liver and his cells. “The body is alien, yet, at 
the same time, myself. This is because ‘the body’ 
involves biological processes beyond my control, but 
these processes still belong to me as lived by me” 
(Svenaeus, 2001, p. 100). The authentic man is a 
spontaneous dweller in all these different regions; an 
inauthentic and a fallen Dasein existentially and 
ontically dwells in one, mechanically making an 
arrangement with the other, who is a stranger to the 
one, in a world that has lost its distance and is no 
longer a habitat, with things that have ceased to be his 
reliable tools that once were ready to hand. In its 
authenticity, Dasein accepts its fragility and its 
vulnerability. It is a factic Dasein who is thrown into 
a situation, and this facticity is what constitutes its 
essential core. The concept of facticity also implies 
that Dasein is meaningfully bound to the conditions 
of its existence and the entities it encounters. This is 
illustrated by Gronda in the following extract: 
 
I am not just alive and existing … . Dasein 
always exists in the world, somewhere, 
some specific there. … [T]hree terms - 
facticity, throwness, and state-of-mind – 
help to describe the process of trying to 
dance with the body you have.  
 
Facticity designates the irreducible 
specificity and always alreadyness of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world. The body I 
have is always unavoidably and 
specifically mine. The concept of facticity 
also implies that Dasein is meaningfully 
bound to the conditions of its existence and 
the entities it encounters. The specifics of 
my “there” mean something to me. 
Whether I have red hair or yellow skin or 
grow up in a brick veneer house are not 
just random, objective facts: they are 
important to me and to others, but I don’t 
get to choose them. I think the ‘there’ of 
my existence is always and most 
proximally, my body. My bodily 
particularities are part of facticity, they 
constitute the ‘mineness’ of my existence: 
it is the inheritance which I do not choose, 
and can therefore choose to choose. (2002, 
¶11 & ¶12) 
 
Heidegger uses the evocative term “throwness” to 
connote this inescapable submission to existence 
itself. We are beings thrown into existence. Dasein is 
always and already “delivered over to the Being 
which, in existing, it has to be” (Heidegger, 1927/ 
1962, p. 173). For Heidegger we are forced to 
confront this ‘throwness’ most powerfully in ‘state-
of-mind’. State-of-mind, or mood, discloses existence 
prior to and beyond either cognition or will. We 
always ‘find ourselves’ in a mood just as, I would 
add, we find ourselves in a body, while knowledge 
and intention come later. At this point, Dasein has the 
opportunity to grasp hold of its ‘throwness’, to choose 
its enigmatic, unexplainable specificity and inhabit 
the possibilities of its ‘there’. “In just this way, the 
practice of Contact Improvisation forces me over and 
over to confront my mood, to pay attention to my 
bodily state, to notice the body I actually have and to 
dance with it” (Gronda, 2002, ¶13). All these layers 
essentially constitute the Dasein’s essential core and 
make it fragile and worldly. This is an easy 
acceptance of the fact that Dasein is thrown into his 
facticity: that is how it exists and so it exists that way, 
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with red hair or white, as a man or as a woman. As 
long this easy acceptance is there on Dasein’s part, 
his facticity is not a problem for him. He is at home 
with all these diverse traits of his as he is essentially a 
dweller searching for a home in a foreign place. This 
tension between the two is what makes him a worldly 
Dasein. Heidegger says that “the mood brings Dasein 
before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there’, which as such, 
stares it in the face with the in exorability of an 
enigma” (1927/1962, p. 175). At this point, Dasein 
has the opportunity to grasp hold of its ‘throwness’. 
Within this model, a person’s normal and 
spontaneous rootedness bestows on him/her a sense of 
dwelling, as the healthy man is a habitual dweller in 
his life world. It is in this sense that the world is not 
alien, nor is the person a stranger to the world that is 
his place of dwelling. Reflection on the body is a later 
phase that is based on pre-reflective habitual 
awareness of the body. At the reflective level, the 
body announces itself objectively in terms of its 
disruption of the normal course of the life-world. The 
same ‘lived body’ in its sheer corporeality is reduced 
to a ‘sick body’ and problematic part that can either 
be corrected of its peculiarity and its abnormality or, 
in the worst case, eliminated. “Heidegger argues that, 
for the most part, Dasein turns away from facing the 
enigma of its throwness. And I think we're even 
expert at turning away from the moods themselves ... 
how often have you said – ‘I’m just not sure how I 
feel’? Grasping hold of the ‘there’ – the facticity of 
Dasein’s throwness – is not an easy task” (Gronda, 
2002, ¶13). 
 
Illness as Unhomelikeness Being-in-the-World 
 
But what if the body I have is paralyzed or 
if my capacity to be touched is marred by 
sexual abuse? What if the body I have is 
judged to be less than human due to its 
colour? Can I still accept the body I have? 
Should I bear it? … How to deal with that 
specificity is a political question. … There 
is very little space for the abnormal body to 
live. Most importantly, I make very little 
space for my own abnormality. (Gronda, 
2002, ¶15) 
 
As a broken tool thwarts the builder’s plans, so the ill 
body disrupts the patient’s plans. While the analogy 
of the ill body as a broken tool effectively captures 
the impact illness has on the patient’s experience of 
the body, this is not to say that the body is a tool and 
that the ill body is a broken tool. According to 
Marcum (2004, pp. 125-137), it would be wrong to 
call the body parts tools since they are also part of 
Dasein as self. They are not only a part of the totality 
of tools, but also, as lived (leibliche), they belong to 
the projective power of the self. 
 
Heideggerians would respond to this as a problem for 
the theoretical philosopher and the speculator who is 
torn between the two: his body and himself. For 
Heidegger, the man on the street dwells in his body, 
and, in the same spirit, dwells in his ‘facticity’ and his 
vulnerability. It is a problem when the sick body or 
the pained body is abstracted from its own homely 
context and from its dwelling place. In abstraction, 
“…there is a subject: a ‘you,’ posited separate from 
another entity, ‘the body’. The relation seems to be 
about possession: you, the subject, have or own an 
object, the body” (Marcum, 2004, p. 40). It is not my 
active design to possess or not to possess a body. For 
Heidegger, we “find ourselves” in a mood just as, one 
can add, ‘we find ourselves in a body’. That is to say, 
in a lived relation, the one does not encroach the 
boundary of the other, both share an intimate bond as 
integral parts of one inclusive whole. 
 
Now, if health is just a harmonious blend of the 
corpse body and the lived one, illness can be 
understood as an unhomelike Being-in-the-world in 
which one's own body is a stranger to one. In terms of 
Heidegger’s notion of sorge (care), the meaning-
structure of illness as Being-in-the World is made 
possible or articulated with respect to a person’s 
concern as a Being-thrown-into-a-world that is often 
strangely unfamiliar or unhomelike. This is certainly 
the case when a person is diagnosed with a fatal 
illness or must live with a debilitating illness. As an 
embodied person, the patient comes to know the 
authentic and genuine self as limited and finite, 
especially in the face of death or chronic illness. The 
face of death or illness and the anxiety (angst) over 
them are the bases of the patient’s life-world or 
Being-in-the-world. By resolving the anxiety 
surrounding the patient’s illness through re-
establishing the patient’s homelikeness, the patient is 
healed even though the diseased body part is not 
cured. 
 
In the contest of health-care, it is would therefore be 
expected that physicians learn to utilize effectively in 
the healing process the patient’s anxious care about 
bodily existence. The question facing us today is 
whether it is too late to humanize the mechanized 
body in terms of the embodied person in order to 
address the crisis of care facing modern medical 
practice. My body is one place where the pain of 
difference can and must be borne. The body practice 
of affirming the facts of your existence – its physical, 
psychological, cultural and political specificities – 
and discovering what you can do with them is the 
only resource to resist a normalising power. And 
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bearing your actual weight is not just a personal issue. 
The global distribution of body mass is a literal 
indicator of world inequities. To bear my actual 
weight is in part to accept that Westerners are more 





Heidegger did not want to make any fuss about the 
pained body or the wounded body, abnormal body or 
split body, a body that is ‘no one’s’ but is left exposed 
in its naked facticity to be scrutinized by ‘any body’. 
His philosophy intended the practical Dasein for 
whom the human body is always already ‘alive’, 
handling, sensing and perceiving intra-worldly things 
in a particular way. The ‘lived-body’ (Leib) is not a 
bounded, material substance (Korper) that is extended 
in space, and it cannot be scientifically observed from 
a distance, because it is already spatially involved, 
manoeuvring through rooms, handling equipment, 
sensing who or what is in front or behind and so forth. 
The body is already ‘in my way’ as the original 
source of all practical comportment (vide Carman, 
1999). According to Cerbone (2000), Heidegger was 
reluctant to talk about ‘the body’ in connection with 
the explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so 
would be at odds with the kind of investigation his 
‘phenomenology of everydayness’ is meant to be . 
 
This paper has attempted to clarify some positions 
regarding Heidegger’s understanding of bodily 
Dasein that present man as essentially embodied and 
embedded in a life-world that remains open to 
accommodating the relational and the intentional 
character of human-Dasein, which is in continuous 
dialogue with both the body as corpse and the body as 
lived, these two being but two different aspects of the 
one unified whole. It may be rightly pointed out that 
Heidegger’s Dasein is an all-inclusive embodied 
person, which incorporates all social, regional, 
cultural and political perspectives on body and not 
just pure consciousness in the absence of body. ‘The 
body’ is so tuned to its surroundings that, like his own 
embodied part, his homely surround becomes a 
dwelling place for the worldly Dasein. That way 
Dasein is at home with other Beings with whom he 
has a shared perspective on his own body. His body 
has a joint authorship that way; his body is no longer 
his own now. It is a book authored by him but that is 
now an open text that is re-interpreted by others and, 
in the process, made their own. His habitual body is 
habitually tuned to its familiar home as its dwelling 
place. That is, ‘the body’ or ‘my body’ has been 
habitually interwoven with a familiar region, 
automatically knowing what is to the left and to the 
right. The body walks me, half asleep, to the kitchen 
in the middle of the night when I need a drink of 
water. The body already knows where the door is, 
where the refrigerator is, where the light switch is and 
so on. According to Merleau-Ponty, our everyday 
doing and acting is made possible only on the basis of 
the pre-reflective know-how of the ‘habit body’ 
(corps habituel) (vide Carman, 1999). Dasein shares 
this dwelling relationship with one’s own body, with 
one’s own homelike familiar surroundings, with one’s 
tools, as all these are now its own alter image, its own 
extended self. The same familiarity characterizes the 
intimate mother-child bond whereby one becomes an 
extended self to the other. One can rediscover the 
lived and the caring embodied Dasein in its true 
home. It is a network of genuine and caring relations 
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